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Abstract 
This paper is an empirical analysis of influence of Corporate Shareholdings Structure on Dividend payout ratio of listed 
Chemical and Paints Companies in Nigeria. The study is for the period of 2008-2013. The listed Chemical and Paints 
Companies are Eight (8) in number as provided by Nigerian stock exchange factbook for 2013. All the eight firms were 
used for the study. Corporate Shareholdings Structure was proxy with managerial shareholding, institutional 
shareholding, block shareholding and foreign shareholdings, while dividend payout ratio was proxy with dividends to 
net income for the same period. The data were collected from secondary source through the annual reports and accounts 
of the firm. The study adopted multiple regression technique. The findings revealed that managerial shareholdings has 
negatively, strongly and significantly impacted on dividend payout ratio of listed Chemical and Paints Companies in 
Nigeria, while Institutional shareholdings, Foreign shareholdings have positive, strong and significant influence on 
dividend payout ratio. But block shareholding shows no significant contribution to dividend payout ratio. It is 
recommended amongst others that the listed Chemical and Paints Companies should increase the number of shares 
allotted to institutional shareholders and foreign shareholders where investors are only interested in dividend payment 
as it may serve as a sure means of having increase in payment of dividend to shareholders. But where shareholders are 
only interested in capital gain rather than dividend payment, the shares held by management should be increased as this 
will discourage payment of high dividend in favour of capital gain. 
Keywords: Dividend payout ratio, corporate shareholdings structure, Bird-in-hand theory, Signaling theory, Agency 
theory. 
1. Introduction 
Dividend is one of the rewards to the shareholder for their contribution in raising fund for a company and for bearing 
the relevant risks. In this regard, management of a company formulates a dividend policy to divide and distribute 
earnings among the shareholders for their investments. Dividend policies have crucial influence on the value of firm. 
This is because a company has to maintain a state of equilibrium between the firm’s growth policies and the dividend 
payout policies. A minor mistake can lead to shareholders dissatisfaction as well as can shake the firm’s growth. 
Due to the extent of business relationships which led to agency relationships, investors are sceptical that managers may 
take decisions for their self interest. So, the need for corporate governance is the necessity to restore investors’ 
confidence in business operations through transparency, accountability and responsibility. Corporate governance 
includes a set of relationships between a company's management, board, shareholders and other interested parties which 
will determine the direction of companies’ movement.  
One of the main features of corporate governance system are the shareholders. They indirectly play a role in corporate 
decision-making especially when it comes to issues regarding dividend payment and capital gain and can be effective in 
reducing agency costs. So, in a good corporate governance system, directors are accountable to the board and the board 
is accountable to shareholders and other interested parties (Esmailzadeh, Jalili, & Zand, 2010).   
Since shareholders are aware that interests of executives are not consistent with them, they also use other mechanism 
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for controlling managers. One of these mechanisms is paying a lot of attention to the structure of ownership. Therefore, 
some are of the opinion that one way to reduce the cost of conflict of interests between managers and owners is through 
increase in dividend payment as this may inform the owners that they (directors) are moving in line with corporate goals 
and shareholders also gain more confidence about performance of the directors. Thus, the dividend is a factor to reduce 
the cost of conflicts of interest and as such dividend payment or its increase will satisfy the interest of the shareholders 
(Mashayekh & Abdollahi, 2011). While some are of the view that investors may only be interested in capital gain rather 
than payment of dividend. Corporate governance is a mechanism and means of creating balance between shareholders 
and management in order to reduce agency problems, which will in-turn reduce the probability that managers pursue 
suboptimal dividend policy (Fakhari & Yosofalitabar, 2010).   
Given to the above background, it could be said that there has not been unanimous agreement by researchers on this 
subject matter due to the inconclusive nature of their researches and their mixed findings. The main objective of this 
study, therefore, is to investigate whether the structure of shareholdings have effect on the dividend policy of listed 
Chemical and Paints companies in Nigeria? The specific objectives are set out below: 
1.1 Objectives of the Study 
The major objective of the study is to ascertain the level to which corporate shareholdings structure influences the 
dividend payout ratio of listed Chemical and Paints Companies in Nigeria. Therefore the following specific objectives 
are set out below: 
i. to examine the impact of managerial shareholdings (MSH) on dividend payout ratio of Listed Chemical and Paints 
Companies in Nigeria; 
ii. to investigate the influence of institutional shareholdings (ISH) on dividend payout ratio of Listed Chemical and 
Paints Companies in Nigeria; 
iii. to determine the effect of block shareholdings (BSH) on dividend payout ratio of Listed Chemical and Paints 
Companies in Nigeria; 
iv. to determine the contribution of foreign shareholdings (FSH) on dividend payout ratio of Listed Chemical and 
Paints Companies in Nigeria; 
In line with the above stated objectives, the study hypothesized the following hypotheses in null form. 
Ho1. Managerial shareholdings have no significant impact on dividend payout ratio 
Ho2. Institutional shareholdings have no significant influence on dividend payout ratio 
Ho3: Block shareholdings have no significant effect on dividend payout ratio 
Ho4: Foreign shareholdings have no significant effect on dividend payout ratio 
A study of this nature will no doubt serve as an indispensable planning tool for managers, policy makers, Investors and 
potential investors. It will assist managers to see corporate shareholdings structure that helps in maximizing 
shareholders wealth through the payment of dividend or capital gain. 
In order to achieve the above stated objectives, this paper is organized into five sections, with this section being the 
Introduction. Section 2 deals with the review of relevant and related literatures. Section 3 is dedicated to the 
methodology of the study. Section 4 and 5 present and discusses the results of the data analysis after which conclusions 
were made. 
2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Managerial shareholdings and Dividend Payout Ratio 
Jensen (1986) argued that managers prefer to retain earning instead of giving it to shareholders as a dividend. Managers 
want to use the resources for the growth of the firm as well as for their personal benefits. Eckbo and Verma, (1994) 
showed that dividend decreases with the increasing power of managerial ownership and also argued that in the  
managers’ controlled firms where they have absolute voting power , the cash dividend is zero. The analysis of Chen, 
Cheung, Stouraitis and Wong (2005) also showed a negative relationship between the managerial ownership and 
dividend policy. Short, Zhang and Keasey (2002) found that there is a negative relationship between managerial 
ownership and dividend payout policy. Wen and Jia (2010) found that managerial ownership is negatively associated 
with dividend policy in the bank holding companies. Jensen, Donald and Thomas (1992) argued that the managerial 
ownership has a negative impact on the dividend payout policy and the firm’s debt.  Mehrani, Moradi and Eskandar 
(2011) found the evidence in support of negative association between the managerial ownership and dividend payment 
policy. The relationship is also clearly recognized in the work of Short, Hao and Kevin (2002) who found a negative 
alliance between managerial ownership and dividend policy. Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) find a large negative effect of 
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announced dividend changes in German companies where corporate insiders have more power. 
2.2 Institutional Shareholdings and Dividend Payout Ratio 
Institutional investors are the large investors such as banks, investments firms, insurance companies and other financial 
institutions etc, who having huge sum of money are capable of investing money in different corporations. Therefore, 
they are very influential in performing their corporate governance roles. Corporate governance is specifically geared 
towards reduction of agency cost. Many prior studies such as Waud (1966), Fama and Babiak (1968) and Short et al. 
(2002) suggested that there is significant relationship between the dividend policy and institutional ownership. Wen and 
Jia (2010) found that Institutional ownership is negatively associated with dividend policy in bank holding companies. 
The relationship is also clearly recognized in the work of Short et al. (2002) who found a positive alliance between 
institutional ownership and dividend policy. Many theories are considered important for the relationship between 
institutional ownership and dividend policy which among others are agency theory and signaling theory. 
2.3 Block Shareholdings and Dividend Payout Ratio 
Concentrated ownership refers to the structure where large shareholders own the huge amount of a firm stock. These 
concentrated ownership or block-holders (the investors who hold at least 5 % or more of the firm stock) are more 
concerned about the monitoring of the management decisions with the purpose of protecting their investments. 
Concentrated ownership plays a significant role in corporate policies, especially concerning the dividend payment 
policy. The management will also give preference to the large shareholders because of their influential impact on the 
firm’s important decisions.  Kouki and Guizani (2009) stressed that Tunisian companies having concentrated 
ownership distribute more dividends. The study also shows positive relationship between concentrated ownership and 
dividend payout. According to Mitton (2005), there exist the positive association between block holding and dividend 
Payout in emerging market. Ramli (2010) empirically found in the study of Malaysian listed companies, where 
ownership structure is more concentrated, that as the shares of the large shareholders increases, firms will strive to make 
higher dividend payout because controlling shareholders have greater influence over the dividend payout policy. Some 
prior studies also showed negative relationship between the concentrated ownership and dividend policy. Gugler and 
Yutoglu (2003) showed that firms with high ownership concentration tend to pay lower dividends. Maury and Pajuste 
(2002) argued that the existence of concentrated large shareholder negatively affects the dividend payout and they found 
the negative relation between the ownership concentration of control and the dividend payout. All these prior studies 
have observed that firm’s concentrated shareholders can influence the dividend policy. 
2.4 Foreign Shareholdings and Dividend Payout Ratio 
Kang and Stulz (1997) find that foreigners investing in Japan tend to underweight smaller and highly leveraged firms.  
They argue that foreigners invest in firms that they are better informed about to reduce the costs associated with 
informational asymmetries.  As Kang and Stulz, Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) find foreign owners of Swedish 
firms show a preference for large firms, firms paying low dividends, and firms with large cash positions on their 
balance sheets. Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984 found that the level of foreign ownership is positively associated with 
dividend payouts. 
2.5 Theoretical Framework 
2.5.1 Agency Theory   
Even if a firm does not have free cash flow, dividend payments can still be useful for the shareholders in order to 
control the overinvestment problem. Easterbrook (1984) argues that dividends reduce the overinvestment problem 
because the payment of dividends increases the frequency with which firms have to go to equity markets in order to 
raise additional capital. In the process of attracting new equity, firms subject themselves to the monitoring and 
disciplining of these markets. This lowers agency cost. For the purpose of this research work, the above theory is used 
to underpin the study. 
3. Methodology and Model Specification 
This study adopts the Ex-post factor design method. This is because the study investigates the impact of corporate 
shareholdings structure on dividend payout ratio of listed Chemical and Paints Companies in Nigeria. The data for this 
study were obtained mainly from secondary sources which were collected from the audited annual reports and accounts 
of the listed Chemical and Paints Companies in Nigeria. The population of the study consists of the Eight (8) listed 
Chemical and Paints Companies in Nigeria. The data of the eight firms were used. This used the Ordinary Least Square 
Multiple regression technique. Multiple regression technique was used and SPSS was used as our tool of analysis. 
3.1 Model Specification 
In an attempt to examine the influence of corporate shareholdings structure on dividend payout ratio of listed Chemical 
and Paints Companies in Nigeria, a multiple linear model is built. The model captures the contribution of Managerial 
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shareholdings, Institutional shareholdings, Block shareholdings, and foreign shareholdings on dividend payout ratio of 
listed Chemical and Paints Companies in Nigeria. 
DIVPAYit = α + β1MSHit + β2ISHit + β3BSHit + β4FSHit + β5ROAit + β6GRWTHit + β7LEVit + µit 
Where DIVPAY is Dividend Payout ratio measured as dividends to net income for the same period  
MSH: Managerial shareholdings measured as the ratio of shares held by the management to total shares in issues 
ISH: Institutional shareholdings measured as the ratio of shares held by institutions to total shares in issues 
BSH: Block shareholdings measured as the ratio of shares held in block to total shares in issues 
FSH: Foreign shareholdings measured as the ratio of shares held by foreigners to total shares in issues 
ROA: Return on assets measured as the ratio of profit after tax to total assets 
GRWTH: Growth measured as the changes in total assets 
LEV: Leverage measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets  
α is constant 
β1 – β7 are the coefficient of the parameter estimate.  
µ is the error term. 
4. Results and Conclusions 
This segment presents the analysis of the data and tests of hypotheses formulated in section one of the paper. First, 
descriptive statistics table is presented and analysed, followed by the correlation matrix table and the summary of 
Regression Result table, The policy implications and Recommendation are made and drawn from the findings of the 
study. 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Skewness 
DIVPAY .0000 .9786 .087685 .2092192 2.899 
MSH .01 .65 .2390 .22041 .559 
ISH .00 .78 .4350 .20197 -.706 
BSH .16 .96 .6992 .20088 -.971 
FSH .00 .39 .0300 .10068 3.128 
ROA -2.76 5.92 0.0660 1.07217 2.983 
GRWTH -55.83 58.17 4.2248 13.59596 -0.097 
LEV 0.13 0.97 0.5681 0.24166 0.047 
Author’s Computation, 2014 
From Table 4.1 above, the mean value for dividend payout ratio is 9% for firms, while Managerial shareholdings and 
Institutional shareholdings were having an average value of 24% and 44% respectively. Also, Block shareholdings have 
an average value of about 70% and foreign shareholdings mean value stood at 3% within the period of the study. The 
minimum value for dividend payout ratio is 0.000 while the maximum is 0.9786. The minimum value of dividend 
payout ratio is as a result of the fact that some of the firms do not pay dividend for some years. Managerial 
shareholdings have a minimum value of 0.01 and a maximum value of 0.65. Institutional and foreign shareholdings 
recorded a minimum value zero (0) and a maximum value of 0.78 and 0.39 respectively. Block shareholdings recorded a 
minimum value of 0.16 and a maximum value of 0.96. It is observed that among the independent variables, managerial 
shareholdings have the highest standard deviation and therefore it shows that the managerial shareholdings have the 
least contribution to the endogenous variable. While on the other hand, foreign shareholdings have the lowest standard 
deviation and it therefore shows its highest contribution to the regressand of the study. The skewness values were all 
close to 0 and 1 which implies that the data is tolerably mild and normally distributed except for dividend payout ratio 
and foreign shareholdings that is high than normal. Therefore the result from the normality test substantiates the validity 
of the regression result. 
4.2 Correlation Matrix 
The table below explains the association between the regressand and the regressors and also the association between the 
regressors themselves. The values were extracted from the Pearson correlation of two-tailed significance. 
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Table 4.2 Correlation Matrix 
Variable DIVPAY MSH ISH BSH FSH ROA GRWTH LEV 
DIVPAY 1        
MSH -0.379* 1       
ISH 0.108 0.094 1      
BSH -0.254**
* 
0.688* -0.367*
* 
1     
FSH -0.084 0.521* -0.112 0.395* 1    
ROA 0.155 -0.147 -0.209 0.038 0.038 1   
GRWTH 0.111 0.148 0.195 -0.042 -0.04
2 
-0.837
* 
1  
LEV -0.102 -0.417*
* 
-0.261 0.077 0.077 0.102 -2.237 1 
Author’s Computation, 2014 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). 
Table 4.2 above shows that all the independent variables (MSH, BSH and FSH) are negatively related with DIVPAY 
except ISH that is positively associated with DIVPAY. However, managerial shareholding is significantly related with 
Dividend payout ratio at 1% level of significance indicating a strong, negative relationship. Also Block shareholding is 
strongly, negatively and significantly related to dividend payout ratio at 10% level of significance. While for 
Institutional shareholdings, foreign shareholdings and Dividend payout ratio were insignificantly related.  Amongst the 
exogenous variables, the relationship was very weak as expected except for only few of the independent variables that 
were significantly related. While some of the independent variables are negatively related, some were also positively 
related with themselves. The tolerance values and the variance inflation factor are two good measures of assessing 
multicolinearity between the independent variables in a study. The result shows that variance inflation factor were 
consistently smaller than ten (10) indicating complete absence of multicolinearity (Neter et ‘al; 1996 and Cassey et ‘al; 
1999 as cited in Shehu & Buba, 2011). This shows the suitability of the study model been fit with the four independent 
variables. Also, the tolerance values were consistently smaller than 1.00, therefore extend the fact that there is complete 
absence of multicolinearity between the independent variables (Tobachmel & Fidell, 1996). 
The Summary of regression result is presented in Table 4.3 
This table shows the regression result of the endogenous variable (DIVPAY) and the exogenous variables of the study 
(MSH, ISH, BSH and FSH). The presentation is followed by the analysis of the relationship and contribution of all the 
independent variables to the dependent variable of the study and also the cumulative analysis. 
Table 4.3 Summary of Regression Result 
Variable Coefficient t-values P-values Tolerance VIF 
Constant .319 2.442 0.019   
MSH -.580 -3.162 0.003 0.335 2.981 
ISH .295 2.137 0.039 0.705 1.419 
BSH -.185 -1.004 0.321 0.400 2.503 
FSH .756 2.465 0.018 0.574 1.741 
ROA .140 3.371 0.002 0.277 3.612 
GRWTH .011 3.182 0.003 0.271 3.687 
LEV -.295 -2.429 0.020 0.636 1.571 
R     0.706 
R2     0.499 
Adj R2     0.411 
F-Stat.     5.690 
F-Sig     0.000 
D/W     1.295 
Author’s Computation, 2014 
DIVPAY = 0.319 - 0.580(MSHit) + 0.295(ISHit) - 0.185(BSHit) + 0.756(FSHit) + 0.140(ROAit) + 0.011(GRWTHit) - 
0.295(LEVit) + 0.1605332 
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The cumulative correlation between the endogenous variable and all the exogenous variables is 0.706 showing that the 
association between Dividend payout ratio and Corporate Shareholdings Structure used in the study is 71% which is 
positively, strongly and statistically significant. This implies that for any changes in Corporate Shareholdings Structure 
of listed Chemical and Paints Companies in Nigeria; their Dividend Payout ratio will be directly affected. 
The cumulative R2 (0.499) which is the multiple coefficient of determination gives the proportion of the total variation 
in the endogenous variable explained by the exogenous variables jointly. Hence, it signifies 50% of the total variation in 
Dividend payout ratio of listed Chemical and Paints Companies in Nigeria is caused by their Managerial shareholdings, 
Institutional shareholdings, Block shareholdings and foreign shareholdings. This indicates that the model of the study is 
fit and the exogenous variables are properly selected, combined and used.  
The Durbin Watson tests of first order auto-correlation which have a value of 1.295 indicates that errors are uncorrelated 
to each other indicating absence of serial correlation within the period of the study. 
Managerial shareholdings and Dividend payout ratio 
From the table above, Managerial Shareholdings has a t-value of -3.162 and a coefficient value of -0.580 which is 
significant at 1%. This signifies that managerial shareholding has negative, strong and significant influence on the 
Dividend payout ratio of listed Chemical and Paints Companies in Nigeria. It therefore implies that for every 1% 
increase in the number of shares held by directors, the Dividend payout ratio of listed Chemical and Paints will decrease 
by N0.58 
This provides an evidence of rejecting null hypothesis one of the study which states that managerial shareholdings has 
no significant influence on dividend payout ratio. 
Institutional shareholdings and Dividend payout ratio 
From the table above, Institutional shareholding has a t-value of 2.137 and a coefficient value of 0.295 which is 
significant at 5%. This signifies that Institutional shareholdings have positive, strong and significant influence on the 
Dividend payout ratio of listed Chemical and Paints Companies in Nigeria. It therefore implies that for every 1% 
increase in the Proportion of shares held by Institutions in listed Chemical and Paints Companies in Nigeria, the 
Dividend payout ratio will increase by N0.30.  
This provides an evidence of rejecting null hypothesis two of the study which states that institutional shareholdings has 
no significant effect on dividend payout ratio 
Block shareholdings and Dividend Payout ratio 
From the table above, Block shareholding has a t-value of -1.004 and a coefficient value of -0.185 which is insignificant. 
This signifies that Block shareholdings is negatively, weakly and insignificantly influencing the dividend payout ratio of 
listed Chemical and Paints Companies in Nigeria. It therefore implies that for every 1% increase in the number of 
shares held in block in listed Chemical and Paints Companies in Nigeria within the study period, the Dividend payout 
ratio have no any significant changes. 
This provides an evidence of failing to reject null hypothesis three of the study which states that block shareholdings 
has no significant impact on dividend payout ratio. 
Foreign shareholdings and Dividend payout ratio 
From the table above, foreign shareholding has a t-value of 2.465 and a coefficient value of 0.756 which is significant at 
5%. This signifies that foreign shareholdings have positive, strong and significant influence on the Dividend payout 
ratio of listed Chemical and Paints Companies in Nigeria. It therefore implies that for every 1% increase in the 
Proportion of shares held by foreigners in listed Chemical and Paints Companies in Nigeria, the dividend payout ratio 
will increase by N0.76.  
This provides an evidence of rejecting null hypothesis four of the study which states that foreign shareholdings has no 
significant effect on dividend payout ratio 
5. Conclusions 
It is concluded that corporate shareholdings proxies have influence on the dividend payout ratio of listed chemical and 
paints companies in Nigeria. It is recommended amongst others that the listed Chemical and Paints Companies should 
increase the number of shares allotted to institutional shareholders and foreign shareholders where investors are only 
interested in dividend payment as it may serve as a sure means of having increase in payment of dividend to 
shareholders. But where shareholders are only interested in capital gain rather than dividend payment, the shares held 
by management should be increased as this will discourage payment of high dividend in favour of capital gain. 
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Appendix: Population of the Study 
 
 
1. African Paints (Nigeria) Plc 
2. Berger Paints Plc 
3 Chemical and Allied Products Plc 
4. DN Meyer Plc 
5. IPWA Plc 
6. Paints and Coatings Manufacturers Nigeria Plc 
7. Portland Paints and Products Nigeria Plc 
8. Premier Paints Plc 
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